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F. D. Maurice: The Man Who Re-wrote the Book
(Presidential Address given at the 2002 Annual General
Meeting of the MacDonald Society)

S

Stephen Prickett

ometime during the eighteenth century there occurred in England
one of those momentous sea-changes in reading that permanently altered
the way in which books, whether sacred or secular, were understood
and interpreted. The effectiveness of the new approach, and its success in
obliterating its predecessor, can be judged by the fact that we are now hardly
conscious of it ever having taken place at all. What makes it very different from
previous appropriations is that it was not the work of any organised party or
faction, and it was only in retrospect that a theory of reading emerged to justify
what had happened.
Though one can find examples enough of realistic secular narrative
fiction in the seventeenth century, it was probably not until the extraordinary
success of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe in 1719 that one becomes aware of how
the new art-form, the so-called “novel,” was altering not merely standards
of realism, but—less obviously, though in the long run perhaps even more
importantl —also the way in which other kinds of narrative were being read
and understood. That such a new and, for a long time, low-status form of
entertainment could or should affect the reading of God’s Word would no doubt
have seemed utterly incredible to contemporaries. Only with hindsight can such
changes be seen to have happened, and explanations sought. Indeed, only since
Hans Frei’s pioneering work, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, appeared some
twenty five years ago, have we learned to see the rise of biblical criticism in
relation to what was happening in the contemporary novel.
The details of Frei’s argument need not concern us here, but two of
the results are beyond dispute. What happened, in short, was that the Bible—and
in particular the Old Testament—ceased to be read as though it spoke with a
single omniscient dogmatic voice (what one might call the authoritative voice of
God), and began instead to be read as dialogue, with a plurality of competing
voices (as it were, the voices of people). At the same time, what had been
universally accepted as an essentially polysemous narrative, with many threads
of meaning, was narrowed into a single thread of story, which was almost
invariably interpreted as being “historical.” Thus we find a very ordinary
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biblical commentary of 1805, Mrs Trimmer’s Hints to the Unlearned in the
Study of the Holy Scripture, writing of God as if he is “author” not just of the
Bible, but of His whole creation, whose human protagonists are somehow

characters in the plot: [end of page 1]
The Books that follow, as far as the BOOK OF ESTHER, are
          called the HISTORICAL BOOKS. The Histories they contain
differ from all the other histories that ever were written, for they
          give an account of the ways of GOD; and explain why GOD
protected and rewarded some persons and nations, and why he
punished others; also, what led particular persons mentioned in
Scripture to do certain things for which they were approved of
condemned; whereas writers who compose histories in a common
way, without being inspired of God, can only form guesses and
conjectures concerning God’s dealings with mankind, neither can
they know what passed in the hearts of those they write about; such
knowledge as this, belongs to God alone, whose ways are
unsearchable and past finding out, and to whom all hearts are open,
all desires known! (iii)
Nor was this a one-way influence. If the Bible was now being read as the
supreme novel, novelists from Jane Austen to George MacDonald were
incorporating biblical techniques and symbolism into their fictional structures.
That, however, is running ahead of ourselves. I want today to look
at a much more unlikely figure in this story of the re-reading of the Bible:
Frederick Denison Maurice. His name is unlikely to be a major one in either
standard histories of biblical criticism, or in histories of the novel, but not least
of the reasons for that omission are the conventions of scholarship that separate
two modes of reading that were historically very deeply intertwined. Maurice
was one of the very few of his generation to see that historical interconnection,
and to understand its implications for the future of biblical interpretation—
implications that, I would argue, are if anything more significant today than they
were even in his own time.
We start with the common ground between the Bible and the novel:
narrative itself. Christianity, we must remember, provided the original grand
narrative. Unlike either Judaism, or the various pagan cults it had supplanted
in the late Roman world, for more than a thousand years the worship of
Christ seemed to its adherents to offer the added bonus of a final and
coherent Theory of Everything. This fundamental consilience (to use E. O.
Wilson’s re-coined word) included not merely the dramatic sweep of the Bible

narrative itself, beginning with the Creation and ending with the Apocalypse;
but cosmology, botany, zoology, and even secular literature itself could be
integrated into a single vast all-encompassing system. In its most developed
form not merely human society, but animals, plants, minerals, and even angels
themselves, were arranged in a divinely ordered Great Chain of Being whose
golden links reached from the throne of God to the lowliest inanimate parts of
Creation.1 The earth-centred Ptolemaic universe, the providential powers of
medicinal herbs, and the hierarchies of mediaeval bestiaries, all bore witness to

the divine scheme of the [2] universe. The very completeness of the narrative
by the late middle ages had made the idea of an alternative story almost
unthinkable.
Even the one apparent cultural exception to this order, the literature
of classical antiquity, was ingeniously incorporated into this great universal
narrative. As early as the first century, Philo, a Hellenised Jew, claimed that the
Greek philosophers such as Plato were not merely compatible with the Hebrew
scriptures, but had actually been influenced by them.2 Other commentators
applied to classical literature the same allegorising techniques that had first been
used in the Christian appropriation of the Old Testament. Virgil’s fourth
Eclogue, with its prophecy of a coming ruler, was understood as a foretelling
of Christ and a parallel to Isaiah. His Aeneid was even read as a parable of the
Christian soul’s journey through life. By the sixth century Cassiodorus was able
to accommodate the whole of classical learning to an organised programme of
Christian education (Prickett, Reading 5-7). Thus sanctified, the classics were
embraced by the Renaissance writers as religious authorities almost on a par
with the biblical writers. Dante makes the pagan Virgil his guide through a
Christian Hell and Purgatory that contains both biblical and classical figures.
Milton, in Samson Agonistes, creates a classical tragedy out of a biblical
story—reminding us in his prologue that “The Apostle Paul thought it not
unworthy to insert a verse of Euripides into the text of Holy Scripture, I Cor. 15.
33.” “[O]f the style and uniformity and that commonly called the plot . . . they
only will be best judge who are not unacquainted with Aeschylus, Sophocles,
and Euripides, the three tragic poets unequalled yet by any, and the best rule to
all who endeavour to write tragedy” (365; 367). All human learning: literature,
art, science and religion, could be seen as being in perfect harmony.
Like all such generalisations, this is of course an oversimplification.
No synthesis of this magnitude and complexity is univocal, or tells only one
story. Even that musical image of “harmony” implies at least different voices or
instruments playing related parts within a single tune. Another analogy might be

that of a thick rope composed of many individual narrative strands. Perhaps the
best metaphor of all would be that of a Kuhnian paradigm. Within a common
overall way of thinking there could be wide areas of disagreement. Aquinas’
great Summa Theologica, now often seen as the supreme statement of the
mediaeval synthesis, was sharply attacked, and even seen as heretical, in its own
time. Like the Bible itself, the grand story of the universe was less a single
narrative than a collection of inter-related stories on a common theme. What
finally broke this paradigm, however, was not any single point of debate, but
rather the collapse of the idea that a total common synthesis was possible at all.
In the wake of the Reformation and the disappearance of the old
Ptolemaic idea of the earth at the centre of all things, the tensions underlying

the always [3] fragile mediaeval synthesis became more visible. As in other
examples of intellectual paradigms, there had been a kind of tacit symbiosis
between the various parts. The self-evident truth of one piece of the argument
seemed to reinforce other areas that may have been logically unrelated. Similarly,
when one piece collapsed, other, apparently unrelated, parts of the synthesis
suddenly seemed less obviously right. The notion of the inherent connection
between knowledge and morality, for instance, was never a central Christian
doctrine per se, but its loss nevertheless weakened the idea that there had to
be a single, discernible, pattern to the universe. Once the idea of a unified grand
narrative in this sense was questioned, it fell to pieces almost under its own
entropic momentum.
This was not simply a matter of ideas. A prevailing paradigm may
represent itself at any stage to its adherents as primarily a unified intellectual
construct, but, as those who dare to challenge it quickly discover, it is also a
locus of deeply entrenched emotions. Both the Reformation and the Catholic
Counter-Reformation had liberated huge new reserves of spiritual energy and
devotion in Europe, and in both Calvinism and the new Catholic baroque
sensibility what looked like new and satisfying versions of the traditional allembracing grand narrative had been painfully re-constructed. Yet the greater
the vigour of the polemic against supposedly “Christian” opponents, the more
both sides were reminded that there was another possible version of events.
The universal paradigm had gone. In place of a single Church there were
warring sects; in place of the traditional synthesis was nascent pluralism. Not
unrelatedly, perhaps, by the eighteenth century religious observance in England,
France, and Germany had sunk to lows that have never been equalled either
before, or, perhaps more surprisingly, since.3
Such changes in collective sensibility, however, rarely have single

or simple causes. The collapse of the traditional Christian paradigm itself
attracted a variety of new narratives: words like “Reformation” or “heresy”
are themselves titles of implied narratives of heroic revolt, or triumphant
fidelity. Other interpretations of European history tell other stories. One strand of
conventional wisdom, for instance, has it that the old providential grand narrative
was finally demolished by three great historical blows. The first, the belief that
we lived on the central body of a limited cosmos was destroyed by Copernicus,
Galileo and Newton in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second, the
biblical tradition that man was uniquely formed in God’s image was exploded
by Darwin in the nineteenth century, and, finally, any assumptions of intellectual
rationality bolstered by the first two were rudely shattered by Freud at the turn
of the twentieth century. [4] One problem with this account, however, is its
dating. No intellectual revolution happens all at once, but the traditional belief in
the uniqueness of humanity was already being treated with great scepticism by
the middle of the eighteenth century, a hundred years before Darwin, who did
no more than administer the coup de grace. Another problem is its source: this
is, after all, the version put about by Freud himself, who was, not very subtly,
attempting to piggy-back his own “revolution” on the prestige of the other two
and claim the same status in the history of thought as Copernicus and Darwin
(326). A third problem is that, as has been argued, the fact of the breakdown of
the entire system was itself probably more significant than the questioning of
any particular part.
Even by the seventeenth century we are already looking not at a single
narrative but a profusion of incompatible and competing ones. Moreover, it is
significant how so many other makers and shakers of human ideas do not seem
to have reacted to these blows with the horror and dismay that Freud evidently
felt they should. If, in the early seventeenth century, John Donne genuinely
felt that “the new philosophy puts all in doubt” (questions of irony prevent an
unambiguous reading), certainly, a full century after Copernicus’ death, Milton
—who not merely knew perfectly well that the earth went round the sun, but also
believed the material of his great saga of the Fall of Man, Paradise Lost, to be
divinely revealed in the Book of Genesis—calmly uses the obsolete earth-centred
cosmos as the setting for his poem. Similarly, though science may well have
contributed to the growth of eighteenth-century Deism, we exaggerate its
importance at that period if we attribute the scepticism of the Enlightenment
solely or even principally to the scientific revolution. There were many other
philosophical, religious, and social roots to the Enlightenment, and Newton’s
theory of gravity, for instance, was not even accepted in France until the mid

years of the century. The publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859
certainly shook the faith of some, including, for instance, the journalist
and editor John Morely, who later admitted that he had changed his mind
about ordination as a result of Darwin. But the frisson that is supposed to have
shaken the entire religious world loses some of its chill when we read actual
eye-witness accounts of the clearly very confused debate between Huxley and
Bishop Wilberforce at the Pitt-Rivers Museum, or notice that neither Maurice
nor Newman, both in their own ways far more significant figures than the
meretricious “soapy” Sam Wilberforce, seem to have been disturbed, either
publicly or privately, by the new biological theory.
The changes brought about just by the breakdown of the idea of a single
system of explanation—a single grand narrative—also resulted in corresponding
linguistic shifts, first in English, but within a century right across Europe. As the
historian Peter Harrison has recently shown, the word “religion” only acquired

[5] its modern meaning of a particular systemised code of belief and practice

in England in the seventeenth century, as the breakdown of the mediaeval
synthesis, and the religious upheavals of the sixteenth-century Reformation,
allowed people, for almost the first time, to see that more than one such system
could exist. Only then could a “religion” be perceived as one system among
several, that could be studied as it were objectively, from the outside. Only then
did the word acquire its plural form.4 In that sense, our concept of religion is
itself only about three hundred years old.
Characteristically, the Protestantism that was to emerge from the
Reformation struggles was not a single dogmatically unified Church, but a
sprawling variety of conflicting groups, all in fact “religions” in the new sense
of the word: self-confessed sects, in that they defined their constituency in terms
of exclusion. Some other groups—whether Catholics, nonconformists, the un
righteous or un-elect—were by definition ineligible for membership, or, more
importantly, for the Lord’s Salvation. All, including even those who claimed
to represent the historic and pre-Reformation Anglican tradition, now defined
themselves not so much as custodians of an all-embracing truth but in relation to
other religious movements, other systems, with whom they were in conflict.
Oddly, almost the sole exception to this was a body whose origins
seemed to most people to be identical with other seventeenth-century millenarian
sects: the “Society of Friends.” Even the name by which they were normally
known, the “Quakers,” seemed to place them with the Ranters and the
Shakers, and there was little in the verbal violence of George Fox’s and John
Woolman’s orations to suggest otherwise. Yet by the late eighteenth century

their continuing membership had achieved a level of education and prosperity
that marked them out as being superior to most other nonconformists and many
Anglicans. Great Quaker families, the Frys, the Rowntrees, and the Cadburys
dominated the relatively new chocolate trade; the Barclays were big in other
growth-areas such as banking and brewing. With such striking innovations as
equal education for their women (Ackworth, in Yorkshire, was the first coeducational boarding school in the world), and new forms of treatment for the
mentally ill (The Retreat, in York), the Quakers by the end of the eighteenth
century were pioneering a new total vision of society. Only the Unitarians came
close to them in educating women.
What was theologically interesting about the Quakers, however, was
their total absence of theology in the normal sense. Their one and only “doctrine,”
if it may be so called, was that of the “inner light”: that we have within us our
own source of spiritual guidance and enlightenment that must take primacy over
any externally imposed system of belief or morality. While outsiders have been
quick to see in this obvious dangers of self-deceit and corruption, something
in the [6] Quaker way has enabled the sect to continue and even thrive over
the succeeding years in a way few other mystically inclined groups have done,
while adapting without undue pain to later intellectual developments. At
the same time they have never been numerous or had any significant appeal
outside educated middle-class intellectual circles: present estimates of British
membership are static at around the twenty thousand figure. Nevertheless, in
the eighteenth century, their stress on the inwardness of religious experience,
combined with their refusal to attempt to construct any kind of external grand
narrative at all, placed them in a unique position in the spectrum of religious
belief.
While avoiding the obvious dangers of adherence to a fixed worldpicture in a society of rapid change, the Quakers in effect gave instead complete
centrality to the inner narrative. They were not, of course, the first to see their
lives in such a way, but by completely discarding the conventional contemporary
structure of external defining narratives, they gave a new kind of stress to their
internal life. Because such a narrative, by definition, embraced their whole
lives, describing every part of their existence, Christianity could be thus reconstituted within them as a personal grand narrative. Even if it could not
explain every external thing in the way that the mediaeval world-picture had
done, it could contain ironies and uncertainties, even the kind of unconscious
drives and contradictions later claimed by Freud or Jung. And it could not be
fazed by new discoveries in science or biblical criticism. In that sense, at least,

it was consonant with the new philosophy being developed by Kant and his
idealist successors in Germany, as well as with the new ideals of sentiment and
subjectivity growing in England and France. Above all, it was essentially
pluralistic.
It is, therefore, significant that the greatest nineteenth century attempt at
reconstructing a universal Christian narrative, Maurice’s The Kingdom of Christ
(1838), was subtitled “Flints to a Quaker Respecting the Principles, Constitution
and Ordinances of the Catholic Church,” and (in its first edition) was arranged
as a series of letters to a Quaker. It was a remarkable book by any standards
—threatening an apotheosis of the Church of England so radical that (to invert
Arnold’s aphorism) Anglicans have ever since neither been able to live with it,
nor live without it.5 Yet Maurice had not even been brought up in the Church of
England. Born and raised a Unitarian, he had for a time in adolescence been
strongly influenced by his mother’s growing Calvinism (Life 28-31). Though
both Unitarianism and Calvinism were passing phases, later transcended, there is
a sense in which the two positions remained as lifelong poles in his thought. The
former, with its denial of the divinity of Jesus, and a strong scientific tradition
among its members, was closer to Deism in its general tenor than traditional
Anglicanism. For many Unitarians, the Book of Nature was as important as
biblical Revelation. Calvinism, on the other hand, was fiercely anti-naturalistic,

[7] sceptical as to both human judgement and knowledge, and stressing the

inscrutability of God’s ways. Thus The Kingdom of Christ combines an extreme
theological liberalism and openness (following Coleridge’s principle that people
are more usually right in what they affirm than in what they deny) with an
exalted view of the Church as the means of personal salvation.
For Maurice the Church is a “universal spiritual society.” The two
qualities are co-dependent. Ironically, it can only be universal if it is spiritual.
No other kind of society could embrace everyone. But it could only be spiritual
if it were universal. For him openness is at the heart of the New Testament;
exclusiveness is quite simply incompatible with spirituality. If at present these
conditions were potential rather than actual, that is because the universal
spiritual society was in a state of slow evolution. Its “truth” has been “working
itself out into clearness for many centuries” through a “strange and painful
process” (2.75). Christianity is not a system possessing a set of clear-cut ideas at
all. It would, Maurice writes, be “hard to establish in a court of law the identity
of the dogmas of the New Testament with those which prevailed in Scotland
and Germany during the eighteenth century” (1.159).
It follows that a “gathered church” of like-minded believers is a

contradiction in terms. The model for the Church is not a group who share
common beliefs, but a family—whose members are bound by deeper ties than
verbal formulae. The Patriarchs of Genesis were first and foremost relatives. The
story of Jacob, argued Maurice, witnesses to the fact that God’s people were
founded on family relationship and not choice (1.275). Moreover, the vigour of
this unique society actually depends on the necessary tensions within it. Just as
at a linguistic level the Bible is charged with a metaphorical tension by which the
concepts of family and fatherhood acquire a new meaning from the uses to
which they are put, so the perpetual tension between the Church as an outward
physical organisation and an inner spiritual society re-shapes our ideas of what it
means to be both an organisation and a spiritual society. Maurice’s chosen title
illustrates this tension. The “kingship” and “fatherhood” of God are inescapable
poles of Christian experience. The “kingdom” of Christ is a “family.” The
deepest writings of the New Testament, instead of being digests of doctrine, are
epistles, explaining to those who had been admitted into the Church of Christ
their own position (1.296).
Though in retrospect it might seem that Maurice’s vision of the Church
represents the only viable attempt to create anything approaching a Christian
grand narrative for the post-Kantian era, he himself would have been horrified
by the notion. For him an all-embracing narrative—in his terms, a “system”—
was fatal to the pursuit of truth. [8]
When once a man begins to build a system, the very gifts and
qualities which might serve in the investigation of truth, become the
greatest hindrances to it. He must make the different parts of the
          scheme fit into each other, his dexterity shown not in detecting facts
but in cutting them square. (Lectures 222)
A “system,” together with its outward political and ecclesiastical expression,
“parry,” was for him a mental and spiritual strait-jacket, permitting only predetermined gestures towards pre-defined goals. It is the vehicle of the secondhand, holding at bay all genuine possibilities of change. It is the enemy of
creativity. In contrast, following Coleridge, what he called “method” was the
pre-condition of all first-hand experience. Without it, impressions and intuitions
were alike random and disorganised. “To me,” he wrote, “these words [‘system’
and ‘method’] seem not only not synonymous, but the greatest contraries
imaginable: the one indicating that which is most opposed to life, freedom,
variety; and the other that without which they cannot exist” (1.272-73). The
Bible afforded the perfect example of the contrast. The systematiser “is
tormented every page he reads with a sense of the refractory and hopeless

materials he has to deal with,” whereas the disinterested reader who does m
approach it with pre-conceptions finds a unity and meaning in the very diversity
of its contents. It is “organic,” providing a “principle of progression” by which
we move from the known to the unknown, and without which the infinite
possibilities of the new remain unexplored because they are inaccessible.
Instead of seeking a satisfactory “system” of biblical interpretation,
Maurice invokes the creative power of language itself. Criticising the
lexicographic approach to language which he sees as characteristic of Horne
Tooke or Johnson, Maurice appeals to a common ground of experience that
echoes the radicalism of Schleiermacher’s Speeches on Religion:
          If they would have stooped to the strong and irresistible evidence
which the workings of our own minds, which all history, furnishes,
          that there is as much vital principle in a word as in a tree or a flower,
they would have understood how it was possible that the root should
be a small ugly thing, and that yet it should contain in itself the
          whole power and principle of the leaves, and buds, and flowers,
          into which it afterwards expands . . .. They would have
understood too, how the peculiar circumstances of any age, moral
          or political, like the influence of sun and air, of spring breezes,
of mildew and blight, may modify the form and colour of a word,
may stint or quicken its growth, may give it a full-blown, coarse,
material look, cause it to sicken into a pale and drooping
abstraction, or strengthen it in all its spiritual sap and juices.
(Friendship 53) [9]
This approach to language as a living, organic and essentially narrative entity is
central to any understanding of Maurice’s mode of thought. He himself was fully
aware of its quite startling implications:
         In using this language I am far from intending to be
         metaphorical. I use that language which I believe does most
         literally and exactly convey my meaning. The point in debate
is, whether words are endued with this principle of life, the
manifestations of which it is impossible in any way so truly to
         express as in language of outward nature. Whether it be so or
         not, I repeat, is the question. To call this language metaphorical
is to beg the question. (Friendship 54)
Throughout Maurice’s thinking he takes for granted the Coleridgean
principle that articulate knowledge is rooted in certainties and modes of
awareness that extend far beneath consciousness to layers that are accessible to

aesthetic rather than rational or discursive forms of apprehension. Maurice’s
Platonism gave him a new gloss to Christ’s sayings about the need for a childlike
mind. As one friend wrote after a conversation with him in 1836, “Maurice says
all little children are Platonists, and it is their education which makes them
Aristotelians” (Life 1.207).
In claiming that words are “endued” with “life,” Maurice is, of
course echoing Coleridge’s well-known affirmation in Aids to Reflection that
“words are not THINGS, they are LIVING POWERS, by which the things of
most importance to mankind are actuated, combined and humanised” (xvi). This
is not some kind of magical attribution, but rather the idea that words develop
progressively as they are used, constantly being adapted and changed to fit new
situations, yet always laden with the freight of their past history. At the same
time, they reach out from that immediate context towards something that is other
and transcendent.
The ambiguity of language is thus, for Maurice, not a hindrance,
but—given the complexity and richness of real thinking compared with
the artificial simplicities of philosophers and theologians—a help towards
greater clarity. What has to be remembered, however, is that this is not so much
a philosophical clarity, as a “poetic” or narrative clarity. Despite the way
in which it has sometimes been used, the Bible is not a rule-book, nor yet a
manifesto, but an on-going recursive story.
Here the influence of his Cambridge tutor, Julius Hare, was highly
significant. A Fellow of Trinity College and later rector of Hurstmonceux, in
Sussex, Hare was one of the finest German scholars in England. His Rectory
was said to contain more than two thousand books in German alone. By far his
best-known work was Guesses at Truth, a collection of literary, philosophic, and
religious fragments, jointly composed with his brother, Augustus, and first

[10] published anonymously in 1827. In spite of its distinctly down-beat title,

it was to maintain an astonishing popularity throughout much of the century,
going through a second, much enlarged, edition in 1838, a third in 1847, and
being reprinted thereafter in 1867,1871 and 1884.
Though most English contemporaries were reminded of the more
familiar maxims of Pascal or La Bruyère, to anyone familiar with the Schlegels
and the other Jena Romantics, the far greater debt to Germany is obvious.
Responding to the comment of one of his colleagues, that he was ready to adopt
the philosophy of “certain writers”6 because he admired their poetry, Hare is
reported to have replied: “But poetry is philosophy and philosophy is poetry”
(Memoir, Guesses xxii).

Guesses at Truth intersperses long essays on specific points of history,
philology, and literary criticism with one-liners or religious and aesthetic topics.
The essays are augmented and increase in number in later editions, constituting
perhaps the best source of second-generation romantic critical theory in the
English language, and developing ideas that are only latent or embryonic in the
more famous Four Ages of Poetry by Peacock or Shelley’s Defence of Poetry.
Above all is Hare’s sense of the changing nature of human consciousness:
. . . Goethe in 1800 does not write just as Shakespeare wrote
in 1600: but neither would Shakespeare in 1800 have written just as
he wrote in 1600. For the frame and aspect of society are different;
the world which would act on him, and on which he would have
to act, is another world. True poetical genius acts in communion
          with the world, in a perpetual reciprocation of influences . . . .
Genius is not an independent and insulated, but a social and
continental, or at all events a peninsular power . . . . (2 136-40)
If we allow for historical development, it is logical also to allow for the
incomplete and fragmentary nature of all our knowledge. For Hare a thing may
be complete and yet unfinished; or finished and yet incomplete. This distinction
serves as a basis for a further distinction, that between the classic and gothic
spirit: “Is not every Grecian temple complete even though it be in ruins? . . . . Is
not every Gothic minster unfinished? and for the best of reasons, because it is
infinite . . .” (2.250).
As Maurice was quick to see, his mentor’s architectural example
could provide an excellent metaphor for the Bible itself. That something can be
at once finished, but by its very nature dynamically incomplete, was a concept
that applied both to language, and, at another level, to the structure of all
narrative—including that of the Bible. In a letter of 1863 he distinguishes three
different ways in which he saw the eighteenth century had understood the Old
Testament: [11]
          1) The purely orthodox. The divine history is in its essence
          miraculous—i.e., it is an exception from the law of all other
histories.
2) The purely naturalistic. All the so-called miracles of Scripture
         may be explained into ordinary phenomena.
3) The spiritualistic (either in the Romanist or Methodist form).
Miracles have not ceased. There are interferences now as there
were of old (Life 2.454)
Turning to his own, nineteenth century, Maurice argues that Strauss and

the “Mythical School,” even while they seemed to endorse the hard-headed
naturalism of their eighteenth-century predecessors, Eichorn and Reimarus, had
had the paradoxical effect of subverting the second of these schemes in that they
had demonstrated “that no records of human life can be content with purely
naturalistic phenomena. There is always the dream of something transcendent.”
But this is a two-edged weapon. Granted that if followed in one direction
it implies all history is based on falsehood, but “follow it to its extreme in the
other direction and you come to the true supernatural origin of history.” In
other words—much as George Steiner was to argue in his 1989 book, Real
Presences—Maurice believed that the transcendent yearnings of everyday
language are not part of the process of “projection,” by which humanity endows
its universe with its own values (as Feuerbach and Strauss believed), but are a
proper part of the sacramental nature of language. By the end of the eighteenth
century, argues Maurice, the three theories of scriptural interpretation had
in effect reached a stalemate, each unable to sustain itself unaided, yet
fundamentally incompatible with the alternatives. All three should rather be seen
as expressions of a much deeper perpetual conflict about the nature of language
itself. It is, by its nature, incomplete: possessing “method,” but always denying
the “systems” that would provide total explanation. Thus language is never
wholly to be accounted for by language, but always points beyond itself.
Sounding at this point remarkably like Derrida, Maurice has a vision of the
creativity of language in terms of perpetual incompleteness, always allowing for
more to be said.7
For Maurice, however, the special property of scripture is not just that
it possesses a bi-focal or ambiguous quality straddling two worlds, but that it
progressively reveals similar tendencies in the everyday world of the reader’s
own experience. History—and, supremely, Biblical history—shapes and
conditions the way we interpret the present: language is simultaneously vehicle
and symbol of this process.
Thus what begins as a theory of biblical interpretation, centring on the
irruption of the divine into human history—what Eliot was to call “the still point
of the turning world”—ripples out into all secular literature, providing a theory
of creativity that refuses to place any boundary between the sacred and the

[12] secular. It is not hard to see how such a view would appeal to someone like
the deracinated Congregational minister, George MacDonald, whose slow return
to Christian orthodoxy was signalled by his growing friendship with Maurice,
and his frequent attendance at the Vere Street Church in which we now are. The
loss of the original grand narrative of the Christian polity was, in the end, to be

more than compensated for by the realisation that what was needed for his time
was not de-mythologising, but re-mythologising—a recognition that the telling
of stories lay at the very heart of what has been called “a story-shaped world.”
But we can, I think, say more. Maurice is all too often treated as
merely a figure in his own time—someone who exemplifies rather than
transcends his own age, or even a saintly man with a second class intellect.
I have argued against that position at length elsewhere, and this is no place to
re-hash that case. But as the preceding passages have hinted, there is much in
Maurice’s arguments that make more sense in our time than it did in his own.
With hindsight, his contemporary reputation for obscurity owed much to the
fact that his arguments mesh better with late twentieth-century criticism and.
aesthetics than they did with the ideas of his own time. The trail of names
and comparisons scattered through my text today tell their own story both of
Maurice’s roots, and the direction of his ideas: Augustine, Dante, Kant, the
Schlegels, Schleiermacher, Eliot, Sterner, Derrida. Maurice was strenuously
engaged with the cutting edge of ideas in his own time, but he is also one of
the very few nineteenth century thinkers whose ideas, like those perhaps of
Coleridge and Schleiermacher, may yet prove to be at least as relevant for the
twenty first century as for his own.
Notes
1. The best account of this is A. O. Loveday, The Great Chain of Being.
2. See E. R. Goodenough, Introduction to Philo Judaeus, and Henry Chadwick, “Philo.”
3. Robert Currie et al. Churches and Churchgoers,
4. Peter Harrison, “Religion “ and the Religions in the English Establishment.
5. For a fuller account see Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, chapter 5.
6. From the context one suspects they were Wordsworth and Coleridge.
7. For a fuller discussion of the religious potential of Derrida’s arguments see Kevin Hart,
The Trespass of the Sign. [13]
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